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SUMMARY
In its Memorandum Decision of November 4, 1999, this
Court reversed both the trial court's denial of plaintiff's
motion to amend her Complaint and the trial court's granting of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

In doing

so,

defendant believes the Court inadvertently and inappropriately
merged two separate issues.

Clarification of the Court's intent

regarding these two separate issues is necessary to guide the
trial court's further proceedings.
In reversing the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendant, this Court reasoned that:
Because plaintiff's affidavits and proposed
amended pleadings raised genuine issues of
material fact bearing on [1] fraudulent

inducement and [2] alteration

of the

release,

summary judgment for defendant was
inappropriate.
Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision, filed November 4, 1999, at
2.

(bracketed numeration and bold text added.)

In reversing the

trial court's denial of plaintiff's Motion to Amend, the Court's
Decision goes on to say:
The trial court erred by relying on [the best
evidence rule] in that plaintiff does not
dispute the content of the release produced
by defendant. Rather, plaintiff claims that
defendant either [1] fraudulently induced her
into signing the release or [2] fraudulently
altered the release.

Id.

(bracketed numeration added,)
These are two entirely separate issues: [1] fraudulent

inducement to entering into the Release; and [2] fraudulent
alteration of the Release.

The defendant acknowledges the basis

for the Court's ruling about parol evidence on the first issue;
and while defendant does not particularly like the result, it is
willing to live with it.

But there is absolutely no basis or

evidence to support the submission of the second issue to a jury.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS NO DISPUTE OVER THE FACT THAT THE
ORIGINAL RELEASE IS AUTHENTIC.
In her own Motion to Amend in the trial court, the
plaintiff did not distinguish or articulate a separate
"fraudulent alteration" claim or issue; she requested leave only
to add "claims of fraud and bad faith." (R. at 51.)

In fact, not

until the hearing on the defendant's Motion to Dismiss and the
plaintiff's Motion to Amend Answer did plaintiff's counsel even
request to examine the original Release.

(R. 123 at 17:8-19.)

Then, after studying the Release with his client for several
minutes, plaintiff's counsel told the Court, "Your Honor, these
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appear to be our signatures, but I don't know how it got on this
document."

(R. 123 at 18:3-5.)

When the Court asked plaintiff's counsel how it was
that the original Release did not have any interlineations on it,
and plaintiff's counsel's copy did, plaintiff's counsel had no
coherent explanation. (R. 123 at 18:6-9.)

In addition,

plaintiff's counsel acknowledged that there was only one
original.1

In essence, the totality of the evidence is that the

original Release is an unaltered original.
Obviously, based on the Court's Memorandum Decision,
the plaintiff can now argue that entry into the original Release
1

The Court:
Okay. But you don't have one [Release] with
original signatures any place in your files
or your client's?

Mr. Halliday:
No, because we just received the one release.
The Court:
You just received the one?
Mr. Halliday:
Just that one, Your Honor [indicating the
original presented by defendant].
P. 123 at 18:13-19. )
3

was induced by fraudulent misrepresentations, and plaintiff can
support that claim with parol evidence.

But this is an entirely

different issue from whether or not the original Release itself
is genuine or has been altered.
In order to prove her theory that the original Release
has somehow been altered, plaintiff has the burden to produce
some credible evidence.

The right to amend under Rule 15(c),

U.R.Civ.P., requires more than just a showing of timeliness, or a
justification for delay, as cited by the Court on page one of its
Memorandum Decision.

It also requires a threshold showing that

the claim which plaintiff has been given leave to add--in this
instance, fraudulent alteration of the original Release--has at
least a modicum of substantive merit.
602, 608 (Utah 1974).

Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d

The newly identified and perhaps

unintentionally articulated claim, has no factual merit.

The

parties' intentions in entering into the Release are irrelevant
to whether the original Release is authentic or not.
Not a scintilla of evidence exists to suggest that the
original has been altered or that it is not authentic.
Ironically, it is plaintiff's photostatic copy of the Release
which has been altered, and which will require considerable
explanation before it can be admitted into evidence. Utah Code
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Ann, § 78-25-17.

Hence, the trial court's admonition to

plaintiff's counsel that pursuing such a course of evidence was
''raising the stakes of this going both ways considerably."

(R.

123 at 17:8-19:5.)
POINT II
THIS COURT INADVERTENTLY MADE A RULING ON THE ISSUE
OF AUTHENTICITY THAT WAS NOT BEFORE IT.
The defendant requests that this Court re-address its
ruling regarding the authenticity of the original Release.
issue was not properly before the Court on appeal.

This

Plaintiff's

Motion to Amend and Objection to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
never contested the authenticity of the original Release, only
that plaintiff had been fraudulently induced to enter it.
Plaintiff's counsel concedes the original is authentic, and that
it bears his and his client's signatures.
The Court's statement in its Memorandum Decision that
"affidavits and proposed amended pleadings" raised genuine issues
of material fact is inaccurate with respect to the original
Release's authenticity, since all the facts support its
authenticity and none contradict it.

Defendant would be

prejudiced by having this decision stand as it is currently
written since it would require defendant to re-establish what has
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already been conceded and to prove at the trial level what was
never contested on appeal.
Every litigant knows that the trial process is fraught
with uncertainty and surprises.

The Court's broad language in

the Memorandum Decision inadvertently grants to plaintiff the
opportunity to win on an issue--the fraudulent alteration of the
original Release--which has never even been pled or alleged.
Prejudice to defendant, under these circumstances, is not merely
the inconvenience and expense of trying an inappropriate claim,
but potentially suffering the entry of a jury verdict on that
claim.
CONCLUSION
Although the defendant does not agree with the Court's
ruling regarding the issue of fraudulent inducement, it respects
the Court's opinion on this issue, and is confident that the jury
will rule in its favor on this issue.

However, the defendant

requests the Court to take a fresh look at the Memorandum
Decision, as it bears upon the authenticity of the Release.

No

evidence shows that this original Release has been altered in any
way, and the signatures on it are, as plaintiff concedes,
genuine.
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The best evidence rule does apply to this original
writing, since no one disputes its authenticity.

It will be the

plaintiff's burden at trial to show that this concededly
authentic document was somehow fraudulently induced, but
plaintiff should not have the additional benefit of being able to
argue the separate issue of alteration to the original Release.
Pursuant to Rule 35 Utah R. App. P., the undersigned
counsel hereby certifies that this Petition is presented in good
faith and not for delay.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

//

day of November,

1999.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of
the foregoing instrument were mailed, first-class, postage
prepaid, on this l%jjL day of November, 1999, to the following:
Paul M. Halliday, Jr.
Paul M. Halliday
HALLIDAY, WATKINS & HENRIE
376 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
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